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ABSTRACT
The dynamic management of traffic within an operational technology (OT) network
raises a number of challenges. To address those types of challenges, techniques are
presented herein that enable end-to-end intent-based networking to control access between
the OT domain and on-premise or cloud-based data center (DC) domains. Aspects of the
presented techniques employ deep packet inspection (DPI) of industrial protocols within
the OT domain (e.g. by sensors) and map Internet of Things (IoT) devices and traffic flows
to abstract tags (through, e.g. a robust security facility), export such tags to a common
policy server that bridges both domains, assign the IoT devices to corresponding security
profiles (e.g., based on their device characteristics as expressed by tag metadata), and map
the security profiles to specific fabric overlay microsegments (e.g., endpoint groups (EPGs))
within a DC or cloud domain.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Micro or macro segmentation policies can restrict traffic within an operational
technology (OT) network (e.g., a cell or area zones in the Purdue model). However, some
flows may need access to resources that are beyond the OT network, such as can be found
in, for example, on-premise industrial or enterprise data centers (DCs), cloud-based DCs,
etc. Segmentation policies cannot provide or control the access requirements between such
domains.
For example, a robot on a factory floor may be required to upload the number of
units that it has produced during the past hour to an ordering application in a DC to confirm
what may be available to ship to customers. Another industrial device may need to
communicate with, for example, a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
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system, an engineering management system, a historian, a data messaging system (such as
a Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) broker), etc. As such, there is a pressing
need for scalable and flexible policy controls for end-to-end flows, such as, for example,
from Internet of Things (IoT) endpoints all of the way to specific application servers.
Today, most access control policies are still administered through Internet Protocol
(IP) access control lists. However, when a device appears on an industrial network – where,
for example, device certificates and authentication mechanisms (based on, for example,
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard 802.1X) are rare – it may
show up simply as a new media access control (MAC) address or a new IP address, with
little additional detail provided to an administrator so that he or she can know which access
policies need to be applied. Aspects of this are illustrated in Figure 1, below.

Figure 1: Illustrative Industrial Network
Even if a device is known, IP access lists are difficult to scale, maintain,
troubleshoot, etc. and may be overly-restrictive, especially in dynamic environments –
which applies to both OT networks (where, for example, devices are routinely hot-swapped)
as well as to DCs (where, for example, compute resources are continually being
redistributed and reallocated to maximize efficiency).
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A secondary, and directly related, challenge is that operational data flows from IoT
endpoints to application servers may represent high or low priority traffic. As such,
administrators may require that these flows be correspondingly prioritized or deprioritized
across the network and compute resources. For example, IoT endpoints may send failure
or imminent-failure messages to a specific application in an industrial DC (e.g., in an
Industrial Demilitarized Zone (IDMZ)). These messages may be prioritized over both the
network and compute fabric to ensure that they are received and acted upon with urgency.
Or, as an alternate example, some IoT endpoints may send non-urgent operational data for
diagnostic or trending purposes, which may be deemed low priority. Such traffic may be
de-prioritized across the network and compute fabrics.
Previous attempts at addressing the types of challenges that were described above
have, among other things, focused on the concept of IoT device abstraction via tags. Such
approaches may be used to integrate with the security domain, as well as to segment the
OT network. However, segmentation policies define either the boundaries of the OT
network itself (macro-segmentation) or the specific rules of intra-network communication
within the OT network (micro-segmentation). As such, segmentation policies cannot
provide or control access between domains outside of the OT network (such as between
the OT network and a DC, whether on-premise or in a cloud).
Under one previous attempt at addressing the types of challenges that were
described above, metadata about an IoT device is collected by sensors. The collected
metadata may include, for example, IP addresses, MAC addresses, vendor details, device
type, firmware version, the switch identifier and the port number where the device is
connected, etc. As an edge sensor learns details of a new device, those details are sent as
metadata about each device, and are associated with abstract tags in an asset inventory
service. The inventory service examines all of the metadata information and tags for the
new device that is being added. As new devices are discovered, the particulars are added
to the live inventory. The tags are used to classify and describe the device, as depicted in
Figure 2, below.
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Figure 2: Exemplary IoT Devices Associated with Tags in Inventory System
However, these tags have no relevance or meaning outside of the OT domain.
Furthermore, in external domains, such as a DC, there is no awareness of IoT device types,
OT protocols, etc. As such, for intent-based policies to be expressed and enforced end-toend, there must be a means to translate abstract constructs in one domain to familiar
constructs in the other, and vice versa.
Another previous attempt at addressing the types of challenges that were described
above employs a virtualized path identifier (VPR). The identifier is an integer that
represents an abstraction of the route and destination (instead of a protocol-specific, formal
IP destination and next hop sequence). Such an approach is useful to construct routes
through heterogenous networks. However, the approach does not examine the notion of
an extensible label that describes what a device is, the group that it belongs to, and what
traffic it sends. It also does not examine the creation of access rules based on such labels.
To address the types of challenges that were described above, and to address the
deficiencies that are associated with the various previous attempts that were described
above, techniques are presented herein that support an intent-based approach for policy
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abstraction and enforcement that facilitates, among other things, inter-domain access
control.
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, device metadata may be shared
from the OT domain to a common element that bridges the OT and DC domains such as,
for example, a common policy server. This may be done through, for example, secure
application programming interfaces (APIs), a security product integration framework, or
other compatible vehicles. Aspects of the results of such an exchange are depicted in
Figure 3, below.

ex.server.com
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Figure 3: Exemplary Exported IoT Device Attributes
After it is shared, device metadata may be used to gain access to a cloud or DC
overlay segment in another network. For example, a Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
or application centric networking solution may employ a logical separation of applications
(microsegments) to isolate application behavior and to protect the applications. With many
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modern user-centric applications, a user gains access to an application through an API, user
authentication, some multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanism, etc. However, IoT
devices (typically headless) do not support a mechanism to self-authenticate to an
application and very rarely do they support API connectivity. These devices can trigger a
connection, but cannot undergo the complex identity validation exchanges. Thus, aspects
of the techniques presented herein employ device identity and activity tags learned by the
network as a descriptive authentication mechanism that allows IoT devices to communicate
with the correct application microsegment in the cloud or DC.
In the context of an SDN or application centric networking solution, applications
are segmented by a SDN controller (e.g., a policy infrastructure controller) and
communication within the microsegment makes use of an endpoint group (EPG) tag on the
IP packet. At the edge of such a fabric, a gateway examines the credentials of the incoming
packet flow and either grants it access to the microsegment (and gives it an EPG) or it
denies the flow.
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, the fabric gateway must associate
an access policy to each microsegment of the SDN solution fabric (essentially, it must
associate an access policy to the overlay segments of the fabric). Rather than use normal
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 5-tuples to grant or restrict access, the incoming flow
is compared with the known set of inventory tags associated with the device of origin. A
security policy is constructed on the gateway device that only allows communication into
a fabric microsegment that has the correct set (or a minimum set) of tags.
For example, an industrial programmable logic controller (PLC) may need to record
an activity with a (e.g., Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)-based) process information
(PI) historian server in the IDMZ which uses an application centric infrastructure fabric.
A security facility, as described below, will have learned the tags of the device. When the
PLC attempts to communicate with the application centric infrastructure fabric gateway,
the set of tags for this device is examined. The activity tags are also compared to determine
if this device is known to communicate with the process information historian server. If a
minimal set of acceptable tags is present, the connection is allowed into the application
centric infrastructure fabric overlay, and the correct EPG is mapped to the packet to ensure
that it is secured.
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Aspects of the techniques presented herein leverage, among other things, a robust
security facility. Such a security facility may support, possibly among other things, the
dynamic management of asset inventory and the real-time monitoring of process data.
Additionally, such a facility may offer fingerprint recognition and anomaly detection
capabilities. For example, from a set of known templates (as a starting point), Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) may be employed to examine each source, destination, and packet to
distinguish normal from abnormal activity.

Such activities may include multiple

mechanisms, including asset or device type detection (e.g., connection point types, energy
and transmissions structure, protocols, packet types, etc. may contribute to identity tags –
i.e., what a device is) as well as activity detection (e.g., the development of activity tags –
i.e., what a device is doing).
Thus, just like it is legitimate to expect a firewall to distinguish allowed from
disallowed packets, it is legitimate to expect a security facility, as described above, to
distinguish valid from invalid flows and packets (with the same caveats regarding
misconfigurations, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), etc.).

From this

validation, tags or labels may be created and exported. From the labels, access rulesets
may be built. As such, building on the principle that DPI can effectively analyze traffic
and distinguish valid from invalid senders and packets, aspects of the techniques presented
herein leverage this outcome to create access rules.
Within a security facility electronic tags may also have the capability to identify the
security posture of a device. Within the application centric infrastructure fabric, a fabric
overlay may contain sensitive applications that are vulnerable to certain types of attack
from unsecure IoT devices (especially ones that are unpatched). The security policy of the
application centric infrastructure fabric gateway is enhanced to correlate the security
posture of the IoT devices with the known vulnerabilities of applications within the target
overlay. If the IoT device or activity tags indicate a weak security posture on a known
device, entry to the overlay can be restricted or controlled (e.g., in a tunable manner,
depending upon the severity of the security threat).
Once mapped to an application centric infrastructure fabric overlay, traffic to or
from the overlay can be controlled at the borders of the DC through traffic contracts that
have been established between EPGs (i.e., a microsegment). Additionally, these traffic
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contracts can also establish service levels that the flows are to receive over the DC network
and compute fabrics. As such, the traffic contracts can prioritize or deprioritize flows over
both the network and compute fabrics according to administratively defined policies.
Illustrative EPGs and traffic contracts are depicted in Figure 4, below.

Figure 4: Illustrative EPGs and Traffic Contracts
Not only does such a method provide end-to-end intent-based security policy
enforcement, but it also enables end-to-end visibility, monitoring, and assurance. For
example, network analytics engines in both the OT and DC domains can now correlate
traffic flows in their respective domains and can report their combined observations to IT
or OT operators for an end-to-end view of traffic from IoT edge devices all the way to the
application servers. Additionally, once a flow is allowed further connection to the IoT
application may require an authentication choreography.

As granter of the access

authorization, the application centric infrastructure fabric gateway also acts as an
authentication proxy.

As the IoT device attempts to establish the connection the

application centric infrastructure fabric gateway identifies authentication challenges that
are returned by the application server. The gateway intercepts those calls and responds,
thus authenticating in the name of the IoT object. Once the process completes, the gateway
forwards the IoT traffic within the secure connection thus created.
It is important to note that existing access policy security tags typically assume a
standard IT structured network, where tags are used to allow or block device-to-device (or
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network-to-network) communication. However, in an OT network such a structure does
not yet exist. In most cases, OT traffic needs to flow to the IDMZ, to the cloud, and in
some cases to the shared DC in the IT domain, and then back again. Aspects of the
techniques presented herein support a systematic translation and rule creation structure that
allows leveraging the elements that are native to OT, converting them into labels, then
using such labels to create rules that can be applied in the IT space. In that space, the rules
can be translated into the creation of micro-segments (e.g., with the associated access
policy security tags or end point groups). However, access policy security tags alone may
not address all of the challenges that were described above as a core missing element is the
translation of OT identity and activity (e.g., security facility tags) into IT-leverageable
labels and rules.
In summary, techniques have been presented that that enable end-to-end intentbased networking to control access between the OT domain and on-premise or cloud-based
DC domains. Aspects of the presented techniques employ DPI of industrial protocols
within the OT domain (e.g. by sensors) and map IoT devices and traffic flows to abstract
tags (through, e.g. a robust security facility), export such tags to a common policy server
that bridges both domains, assign the IoT devices to corresponding security profiles (e.g.,
based on their device characteristics as expressed by tag metadata), and map the security
profiles to specific fabric overlay microsegments (e.g., EPGs) within a DC or cloud domain.
Further, traffic contracts are defined and enforced between EPGs for both access
and treatment policies, allowing such traffic contracts to also apply to flows sourced-from
or destined-to specific IoT devices. As a result, administrators no longer need to use
cumbersome, unscalable, and error-prone IP access lists to enforce inter-domain access
policies. Additionally, end-to-end visibility is enabled as the flows may be logically
identified in each domain via domain-specific abstractions (specifically, through tags in
the OT domain and EPGs in the DC domain) and correlation of these complimentary views
may be done by applying the tag-to-EPG mappings performed at the central policy server.
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